The appointment of Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916) as secretary of state for war enhanced the ministry’s standing in the country, while the international emergency offered the Liberals a means of escaping their domestic political difficulties. In the short term, the outbreak of war appeared to strengthen the government’s position. The Liberal Government at War and the Formation of the Asquith Coalition ↑ Britain declared war on 4 August, with only two members of the cabinet resigning – John Burns (1858-1943) and John Morley (1838-1923). Fearing that the breakup of the Liberal government would open the way for a pro-war Tory or coalition administration, most of the anti-war Liberal ministers fell in line. Arguably more important in convincing the waverers in the cabinet was the skilful use made by the Prime Minister, Herbert Henry Asquith (1852-1928), of a note from the Opposition leader, Andrew Bonar Law (1858-1923), offering political support in the crisis from the Conservatives (known in this period as the Unionists – or officially, after 1912, as the Conservative and Unionist Party). “Prussian” military aggression outraged Liberal opinion, and a forceful performance by Grey in the House of Commons on 3 August did much to rally the party behind a decision for military intervention. This situation was transformed by the German violation of Belgian neutrality. Indeed, while Grey himself was gravely alarmed by the prospect of Germany overwhelming France and establishing a continental hegemony, it was clear that a majority in the badly divided Liberal cabinet – and in the wider Liberal Party – were resolutely opposed to any British involvement in a European war. Despite this, and even as the European situation deteriorated following the assassination in Sarajevo, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933), insisted that his country retained a diplomatic free hand and was bound by no treaty obligation to intervene in a war between the Great Powers. Over the preceding decade, diplomatic arrangements with France (1904) and Russia (1907), intended primarily to settle outstanding disputes between colonial rivals, had seemingly pulled Britain into the continental system of alliances and away from her traditional policy of “Splendid Isolation.” Following an international crisis over Morocco, the Anglo-French Entente was supplemented by a series of staff talks between the British and French armies concerning the prospect of collaboration in a future war against Germany, with whom Britain had become engaged in a costly naval race. The European crisis of 1914 was initially greeted with uncertainty in London. Most worrying of all was the looming threat of civil war in Ireland, where Nationalists and Ulster Unionists, divided over the prospect of Irish “ Home Rule,” were assembling rival paramilitary forces. Yet the final years of peace saw the government confronted by a series of seemingly intractable challenges, including a sustained outbreak of industrial unrest and a campaign of civil disobedience by militant suffragettes. Shored up by a “Progressive Alliance” with the recently-formed Labour Party, the Liberals had embarked on an ambitious programme of social, fiscal and constitutional reform. By July 1914 a Liberal government had held office for more than eight years, having won a landslide general election victory in 1906 and two further elections (with much reduced majorities) in 1910. The years immediately preceding the Great War were a tumultuous period in British politics. Introduction: British Politics and the Coming of War ↑
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